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relating to the Rural Electrification Administration; to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

A resolution adopted by the Greenwich Grange, Greenwich, Ohio, remonstrating against the proposed Lake Erie-Ohio River Canal; to the Committee on Public Works.

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JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE RELEASES STUDY ON ECONOMY OF MAINLAND CHINA—REPORT OF A COMMITTEE—SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS (S. REPT. NO. 348)

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the performance of a nation's economy, it can be argued, is ultimately the decisive determinant in shaping its political posture in the world.

But important as it is, we have tended to neglect the economic side in assessing the role of mainland China in world politics today. While there is an enormous thirst for more information about China, this interest has been focused largely on the political side.

For this reason, the Joint Economic Committee, at the suggestion of the distinguished senior Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS], who is the ranking Senate Republican on the committee, undertook a study of China's involvement as an entity in the economic world.

I am pleased to announce that I have today filed with the clerk of the Senate the committee's report on its study, "Mainland China in the World Economy." The report grows out of 4 days of public hearings in April during which the committee heard testimony from 10 China specialists. The committee's study was in two phases. The first phase involved the preparation of a two-volume compendium of detailed studies by a score of invited specialists recognized as authorities on specific aspects of the Chinese economy. That compendium, entitled "Economic Profile of Mainland China," was released in March.

The committee's aim was to throw light on the ups and downs of the Chinese economy since the Communist regime came to power in 1949. We heard witnesses discuss how agricultural and industrial resources are allocated in an economy wavering between economic pragmatism and revolutionary dogmatism and to what degree China's economic performance enables her to play a role in international trade and politics.

I would like to highlight some of the conclusions reached by the committee's study:

First. China emerges from these hearings as a confused giant, with little understanding of the outside world and viewing herself as threatened by hostile powers.

Second. Despite uneven economic performance under Communist leadership, ideological repercussions have given China a more manageable labor force and economy than that of many of her Asian neighbors.

Third. Despite agricultural crises, there were no authentic reports of famine and an ample food situation is reported.

Fourth. Remarkable gains have been made in education, medicine, public health, and scientific research.

Fifth. Her growing economy can allow for major nuclear weapon development.

Sixth. It is not likely she will increase her military posture in North Vietnam because of a fear of a United States-Sino confrontation in a conventional war.

Seventh. Since three-fourths of her foreign trade is with our allies, the American embargo on nonstrategic trade with China has had little economic effect upon China since alternative trade with our allies has been available.

Eighth. As long as there is U.S. military presence in Vietnam, the political justification for our present trade embargo would not be questioned by economic realities.

I ask unanimous consent that a summary of the Joint Economic Committee report be printed in the Record at this point.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The report will be received and printed, as requested by the Senator from Wisconsin.
SUMMARY OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE'S REPORT ON MAINLAND CHINESE ECONOMY GATHERING STATISTICAL DATA

Any serious study of the Chinese economy must first be footnoted with a word of caution about the difficulty in gathering accurate data. This is not a problem unique to China, for we have the same difficulty with other "lesser-developed countries." However, the problem is compounded in China by the fact that the Chinese State Statistical Bureau ceased publishing official data in 1961. In 1961, when she was in economic depression and the "Great Leap Forward" created incredible economic confusion, it was thought that they withheld information to "save face." However, most witnesses agreed that the policy has been continued regardless of the prevailing economic condition.

There is a problem in measuring population, translating this uncertain population figure into an estimate of per capita daily caloric consumption, (in estimating food production) and calculating agricultural and industrial output. In spite of these difficulties in making satisfying and reliable estimates, and granting the frequent discrepancies in the estimates made by various China experts, both at home and abroad, it is still fair to conclude that we do know quite a bit about Communist China.

DOMESTIC ECONOMY

One of the most striking features about the performance of the Chinese economy has been its unevenness. Leaving aside the period from 1949-52, devoted largely to bringing economic law and order to the war-torn mainland, most experts estimated that the average growth rate for the period of 1952-66 was approximately 4-5 percent. Yet the deviations from the average were enormous. The 1952-57 period was marked by strong economic rationality and relatively little ideological interference; in 1958 the regime undertook a new push for greater ideological purity—"the Great Leap Forward" which resulted in economic disaster; by 1962 the regime returned to a more rational approach to economic planning. In recent months we have seen another possible swing to stricter orthodoxy. Although official Chinese reports state that the economy has not been seriously disrupted, it is still too early to tell.

Agriculture

Agricultural production and per capita food consumption statistics are sometimes conflicting, but combining estimates with eyewitness reports, the image projected over the last two or three years is one of both amply supply and distribution of food with no widespread hunger. When comparing famines during pre-Communist regimes, for

example in 1926 when 20 million people died, with the 1959-61 famine, we find there has been some malnutrition but no authentic reports of starvation.

However, there is no doubt that agriculture, which accounts for 81 percent of China's economic activity, has been and continues to be the weak spot in her economy. She has only 7.8 percent of the world's cultivated land to feed nearly 25 percent of the world's population. Her biggest frustration is her "brown thumb," for almost everywhere Communists have managed either to reduce agricultural production or at least to keep it from growing as it might reasonably have been expected. In spite of the tolerable food situation, agricultural failures have affected the entire economy, thus accounting in large part for China's inability to increase imports of industrial machinery.

The Committee was told that the Chinese have attempted to maintain a level of approximately 2,000 calories per day per capita. Just how well they have met this target is one of the points on which the statistical information is contradictory. Calories are, of course, not the ultimate criteria of nutrition. Whereas these estimates, relying on a common denominator for food sufficiency, concentrate on per capita grain supplies, there are said to have been very large gains in the supplies of eggs, vegetables, fruit, poultry and meat.

Chinese economic planners have been confronted by two alternatives in their drive to expand agricultural production: 1) extend the cultivated areas or 2) seek to increase the yield of the acreage now in use by application of modern intensive farm methods. Faced with this dilemma, the government has chosen the second alternative, and in particular has favored the most productive and stable areas. This policy may simply be good economics, but it was also suggested as a consequence of the growth in provincial autonomy.

In addition to agricultural problems, China has been plagued by medical and educational problems. However, the Committee was told that no meaningful survey of recent economic performance in China dare neglect reference to the remarkable gains she has made in education, medicine, public health and scientific research.

Education and medical

The number of children and young adults in full-time educational institutions today is 5 to 7 times the school enrollment in 1949. The enrollment of over 10 million children in secondary schools is 10 times that of the 1 million in 1949. College age students number about 1 million. Statistics on the numbers involved in the educational process do not tell us very much, of course, without some evaluation of the quality and substances of the educational activity. Certainly it stands to reason that an authoritarian regime, engaged in a "great cultural revolution," must have some strong ideas about what is, or is not, "culture." Scientific and non-ideological education may be presented accurately, but we do know what neither Chinese industries nor schools are viewed as purely economic or efficiently oriented units.

China's gain in medical and related public health fields has also been attested by many recent visitors to China. The Committee was told that the infant mortality rate has dropped until it is now comparable to Canada's rate! Cholera, small pox, typhoid, typhus have almost been eliminated. A member of the U.S. Public Health Service stated a few years ago that the "prevention and control of many infections which had ravaged China for generations was a most startling accomplishment." It was also reported that because China had been plagued by large and frequent epidemics, the government had gone to great lengths to enlighten the entire population on health and sanitation consciousness through intensive radio propaganda.

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Industry

China has made great strides in improving the industrial sector of her economy. The Committee was told that industrial production rose on the average by 11 percent between 1949-65 and by 20 percent in 1966. If the 1966 claim is at all accurate, the industrial production index is at least 350 right now, a record few impoverished countries can claim. And in order to support industrial and agricultural gains, Chinese capital investment in electrical power, chemical fertilizers and textiles has amounted to 20-25 percent of her GNP, an unusually high investment rate for an underdeveloped country.

The Committee was told that increased investment in electrical power has enabled China to modernize industries by equipping them with more electric-driven machinery. The nuclear energy program is a good example. The Chinese Communist newspapers also have frequently disclosed that in the steel industry more and more electric converters are being used to produce quality steel and alloys.

Another example is the rapidly expanding chemical fertilizer industry, in which synthetic ammonia is produced by the electrolysis method. It was estimated that Chinese production combined with Japanese imports of chemical fertilizers has enabled the central government to supply the agricultural sector with 3 times the 1957 amount of chemical fertilizers.

The textile industry was the largest branch in the whole industrial sector during the 1950's and perhaps still is now. Increased investment in textiles, particularly cotton, has enabled the Chinese to export to Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong.

As one witness put it, China is a "muscle-bound giant", with unleashed potential. She is one of the four top producers in the world of coal, iron ore, mercury, tin, tungsten, magnetite, salt and antimony. She is self-sufficient in oil, as a result of discoveries at the Tach-ing oil field and she has offered to export oil to Japan; her coal resources are good for at least a century. She has also made progress in warding off natural disasters in irrigation, flood control and water conservation.

DOMESTIC POLICY

Ideological effects on industry and agriculture

Ideological shifts have been among the most significant variables in both industrial and agricultural performance in China. They have affected industrial management in four main ways:

1. The question of who makes the decision in a factory: the "Reds-versus-experts" dilemma.
2. The method for motivating workers: moral stimuli versus material incentives, such as piece rate systems, bonuses and significant pay scale differentials.
3. The method for eliminating class distinctions: forcing management personnel to spend one or two days per week in physical labor and promoting the worker to participation in management decisions.
4. The amount of time spent on the job in political education and ideological indoctrination.

Agriculture has also been affected by ideological shifts. At first, agricultural production was spurred largely by stimulating peasant productivity through traditional material incentives—peasants maintaining their own private plots and rural markets operating freely. During the "Great Leap Forward" plots and markets were eliminated and commune movements were undertaken. This tremendous dislocation brought disastrous results, and so material incentives and private plots were quickly reintroduced. Agricultural prices were allowed to rise and peasants received more income from the commune and their private plots. There is reason to believe, now, that the central gov-

ernment may have considerable difficulty in convincing the provincial leaders that another try at revolution in agriculture is desirable. However, interference by the Red Guards and central government is clearly meeting with local and regional resistance.

It is significant to point out the degree of autonomy the provinces have in determining economic performance; this has brought into question the central regime's ability to effectuate major changes in policy. However, several witnesses cautioned against concluding that all political interference and ideological indoctrination has been detrimental. Used in moderation, Maoist-Marxist ideological teaching, working through a more equal distribution of income, the absence of a distinct privileged class and a strong emphasis on moral incentives have tended to give China a more manageable labor force and more manageable economy than that of some of its Asian neighbors.

FOREIGN TRADE

Foreign trade has played a significant role in China's economic growth, as a highway for the transmittal of new technology, new goods, and new methods of production.

During the early 1950's, the pattern of China's trade closely resembled that of most other underdeveloped countries, consisting mainly of the export of domestic agricultural and mineral products, supplemented by some finished textiles. These were, in turn, exchanged for machinery and specific types of raw materials, unavailable at home, and required for processing by domestic industrial plants. China's principal trading partner in the early 1950's was determined by ideology preference: the U.S.S.R. who accounted for over 70% of China's external trade. Imports of machinery from the U.S.S.R. ran as high as \$500-600 million per year.

During the present decade, the pattern of China's trade has changed dramatically. This is attributable to two main factors: the collapse of the "Great Leap Forward" in 1958-60, and the Sino-Soviet split in 1956.

Dislocations caused by the "Great Leap Forward" reduced the domestic food supply, so that industrial goods imports were compressed sharply while food imports, constituting 30-40% of total imports, were increased. However, rice, vegetables, processed foods and meat products continued to be exported to balance the grain import costs. Textiles also remained a dependable earner of foreign exchange. The principal contribution of imports in the early '60s was maintenance of economic and political stability, during the agricultural disasters and during the political splinterings that occurred between the U.S.S.R. and China.

By 1965 China was able to repay the U.S.S.R. over \$500 million in total outstanding debts, and thus, she became a net capital exporter, with approximately \$400 million in foreign exchange reserves, a situation quite unique for an "underdeveloped" country.

By 1965 we find that the orientation of China's foreign trade has been reversed completely with the result that non-Communist countries now account for over 70% of her \$4.16 billion foreign trade. Except for the U.S.S.R., which ranks third, China's chief trading partners, in descending order, are: Japan, Britain (through Hong Kong), West Germany, France, Canada, Australia and Italy. Most conspicuous at present are China's growing imports of advanced types of production equipment from our allies, including complete "turn-key" plants embodying new technologies. The industries for which such plants have recently been purchased include: oil refining, synthetic ammonia, urea, industrial alcohol, synthetic fibres, acetylene, wire-drawing, tubes and pipes, glass, and a cold strip steel rolling mill. The importation of these plants is often accompanied by the arrival of technicians who help with the installation and testing of the purchased equipment. It was thought that if the Chinese

continue their current agricultural investments in chemical fertilizers they should be able to continue the approximately 3 percent annual increase in agricultural production—and grain imports from the West should decline sharply in 1967.

Let us now look briefly at the structure of China's trade with whom she trades:

1. Japan. Sino-Japanese trade is based on barter—not foreign exchange. Chinese exports consist of inputs for Japanese industrial production—iron ore, pig iron, coal and soybeans. Trade between the two has increased by more than 35% in the first six months of 1966.

2. Western Europe. (Including Great Britain). Trade has not increased as rapidly here as it has with Japan; however, the statistics are still quite significant. In 1964, 1965 and the first half of 1966, China's exports to Western Europe increased by approximately 30 percent annually, but China's imports of chemical fertilizers and industrial plants increased even more rapidly. In order to finance the approximately \$50 million import surplus in trade with Western Europe and the large scale grain imports from Canada, Australia and Argentina, China has earned sterling in trade with Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore.

3. Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore. It is by exporting to these three countries that China has been able to build up its sterling reserve, which in 1965, reached almost \$500 million.

China has earned an excellent credit rating during the last 17 years and many firms in the non-Communist countries desire to increase their exports, including complete industrial plants, to China on long-term credit. China has not yet sought long-term credit but should be able to obtain it, if and when it is desired. For if her needs for extensive modernization in such areas as metallurgy, chemical production, machine-building, and transportation continue at their present rate, the Chinese market for production equipment and technical know-how from the West will continue to expand.

The hopeful outcome of this situation may be the basis of a possible change in political attitudes of the Chinese leaders toward the Western world. Despite the fact that the Chinese government's attitude toward a foreign country is based on ideology and not trade or commercial benefits, it is hoped that: Trade with the outside world is probably the most promising way by which the Chinese will in time come to realize the actualities of the world around them and accept the inevitability of peaceful coexistence with the rest of us on a live and let-live basis.

VIETNAM

When examining China's military posture in light of her ability to actively engage in the Vietnam War, the witnesses concluded that her present, limited aid to North Vietnam can continue indefinitely without seriously disrupting her economy. Foreover, a build-up of aid would be economically feasible for China.

In contrast to the first Joint Economic Committee study on Chinese military potential, the testimonies given at the hearings lead to the conclusion that the problem in maintaining a steady domestic rate of growth and expanding a mighty military force does not lie in such a delicate balance. Her impressive economic achievements have enabled her to modernize military equipment, advance her nuclear capability and perhaps now equal the Soviet Union's military posture of the 1950's. China's military budget in 1965 was placed at \$8 billion or about 10 percent of her \$90-100 billion GNP. With a population of over 700 million, China has an army of more than 2 million, of which she could mobilize from 70 to 100 divisions, costing her about \$2 billion per year.

There is little doubt that, assuming no chaotic internal breakdown, China can sup-

port a major involvement in a border war. However, this is not to say that she can fight a guerrilla-type war serving as proxy for, say, the guerrilla forces in Vietnam. She can supply them, as she has already done by sending in engineering troops to assist in building and repair of roads, but, should she elect to send in a large number of troops, the entire character of the war would be changed from a guerrilla conflict to a more conventional war, in which United States firepower would be infinitely more effective than her own.

It was concluded that China's aid to North Vietnam is based on a defensive military posture, not an offensive one. Her immediate aim is to secure North Vietnam as a buffer state, similar to the Russian theory in Europe of having as many buffer states around her as possible and proselytizing whenever possible to convert them to Communism.

When asked whether or not the rice surpluses in Southeast Asia would justify Chinese military expansion, the general conclusion was that China could get rice far more effectively by trade than by invasion. One witness suggested that the Chinese have had plenty of problems with their own peasantry and these problems would be a million times compounded with a conquered peasantry.

EMBARGO

The United States has maintained a unilateral embargo on trade with Mainland China since the Korean War. As we have already noted, despite this embargo, 70 percent of China's trade today is with our allies. Under these circumstances, our refusal to trade with China has been ineffective, since alternative trade relations with our allies have been readily available.

An overwhelming consensus among experts heard pointed to the conclusions that:

1. The American embargo on nonstrategic trade with China has accomplished very little in terms of retarding growth of the Chinese economy.

2. The embargo may have been detrimental to the longrun interests of the United States in its relations with its allies.

3. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that any relaxation of the embargo would result in a significant expansion of bilateral trade with the United States, so long as the United States has a large military presence in Asia, especially in Vietnam.

4. Hopefully, closer trade relations between China, the United States and the major non-Communist industrial nations could significantly contribute to integrating China into the world international system through eroding many of the simpler ideological components with which an isolated China must view world trade and politics.

5. Since the embargo policy is not warranted on economic grounds, its continuation must be weighed as a part of our international political policy.

Since the economic case for an embargo appears on the evidence of these experts rather unpersuasive, the American people and policymakers might consider re-evaluation of our total embargo policy, which the rest of the world regards as a "symbol of our policy to isolate China." Except for keeping Peking out of the United Nations and other international bodies, it has certainly not isolated it, as the economic record shows only too clearly.

BILLS INTRODUCED

Bills were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. DOMINICK:

S. 1966. A bill for the relief of Sgt. Walter Spillman, U.S. Army; and

S. 1967. A bill for the relief of Katherine E. Baab; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HOLLAND:

S. 1968. A bill for the relief of Dr. Jose Ernesto Garcia y Tojar; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HART:

S. 1969. A bill for the relief of Dr. Oscar Calimag Tumacder and his wife, Dr. Thelma Tumacder; and

S. 1970. A bill for the relief of Dr. Sudarsan Misra; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MOSS:

S. 1971. A bill to amend the Consolidated Farmers Home Administration Act of 1961 to authorize loans to certain cooperatives serving farmers and rural residents, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

(See the remarks of Mr. Moss when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. NELSON:

S. 1972. A bill to provide for the disposition of funds appropriated to pay a judgment in favor of the Emigrant New York Indians in Indian Claims Commission Docket No. 75, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

(See the remarks of Mr. NELSON when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

FHA LOANS FOR FARM COOPERATIVES

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, there is a credit gap in the present loan authority of the Farmers Home Administration which I feel should be closed. It is keeping many worthy farm cooperatives from borrowing the money they need to expand and improve.

As we all know, the Farmers Home Administration has full authority to make or insure loans to rural nonprofit groups. These loans can be used to improve or establish grazing associations, to establish recreation associations, or to undertake water or sewer projects.

But a rural cooperative—that is a cooperative organized to provide processing, organized purchasing, or marketing service—is not eligible for such a loan unless it is in the so-called poverty class—unless two-thirds of its families are living on incomes of less than \$3,000 a year. Then the cooperative is eligible under certain loan authorizations of the Economic Opportunity Act which the FHA administers.

There are undoubtedly many rural cooperatives in the country which have sufficient equity, experience, and access to capital so that they do not need to apply to FHA for economic opportunity loans.

But there are other cooperatives which fall below this level of affluence, yet cannot qualify under the poverty category. They exist in a credit gap and it is primarily to close this gap that I am introducing a bill today.

This is, however, a general bill. Under it the Secretary of Agriculture may make or insure loans to all local cooperative associations which furnish to farmers and rural residents services and facilities for harvesting, storing, processing and transporting or marketing agricultural products, or consumer-purchasing services, or who process and market products for farmers or rural residents.

The loans may be used to organize and establish an association, to acquire necessary land, buildings or equipment,

or to repair, expand or enlarge such services and facilities. In establishing a cooperative, the applicant must be able to certify, of course, that there is a need for the services and facilities in the community which is not now being met.

During the years the Farm Credit Administration was in existence a large number of farm cooperatives were financed and inaugurated throughout the country. A number were established in Utah, and early in the 1940's the Utah Cooperative Association which has a \$4.5 million annual volume of business and nearly 40 employees, was granted a life-saving loan by the FCA.

These loans were made at a time when no other financing was available. There is no question that they not only launched many cooperatives, but kept others afloat.

It has been some years, however, since any Federal agency has had any authority to make loans to farm cooperatives, short of the authority in the poverty program. Only one loan has been made in recent years to a Utah cooperative—the Castle Valley Cooperative at Huntington. This was a \$40,000 FHA loan, repayable over a 30-year term at 4½ percent interest. The loan is considered financially sound, and is backed by excellent collateral and a fine 5-year period of consistent sales growth with good net earnings.

Other cooperatives who have sought loans have had to get them elsewhere and they are paying high rates of interest. Eight percent simple interest is common and on the low side. Some cooperatives, I am told, are paying 10 percent simple interest, and a few are paying as high as 12 percent simple interest for short-term operating loans, fully secured by inventories, receivables, and real estate.

The only way an agricultural business enterprise can succeed when paying interest of this type is to have superior management, abounding good luck, and the guiding hand of providence. Only time will tell whether cooperatives in question possess all three.

However, there is no doubt that if these cooperatives could have borrowed funds at FHA interest rate levels, their chances of survival would be much greater. And it is certain that their net income would be higher. It has been estimated that the agricultural cooperatives within the Utah Cooperative Association alone would earn between \$75,000 to \$100,000 more annually under FHA interest rates than under the higher interest rates they are now having to pay.

Agriculture is becoming more and more marginal in Utah every year, and more and more of our farmers are leaving the land. Our water scarcity, and the high cost of water which is available, together with the high freight rates which plague all of the West, make our operations more difficult than they are in some other areas. I am sure this is also true in many other Western and Southwestern States.

In my opinion, Mr. President, we should be doing everything we can to keep our farm cooperatives healthy and afloat. They are a sound instrument through which farmers can help themselves and gain a greater measure of independence from the Federal Government.

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It is the announced policy of the Department of Agriculture, as stated by Secretary Freeman, that the Federal Government shall sponsor, support and aid in the development of agricultural cooperatives. This policy received an interesting interpretation in the Kiplinger Agricultural Letter of March 24, 1967:

Government is in the process of disconnecting itself from agriculture—commercial agriculture—gradually trying to ease out of its commitments. Farmers must do more for themselves—without so much government help.

Cooperatives are to be built up, in a way, to replace government as the biggest single influence in farm affairs—gradually but surely. Co-ops and farm trade associations are to take over government price functions.

It (government) will make a point of encouraging farmers to support the co-ops or form news ones or farm trade associations to perform many of the functions now handled by the USDA—involving both production goals and marketing.

Whether every nuance in this prediction is true or not, it is certainly clear that the farm cooperatives do offer the many American farmers who seek to lessen the influence of the Federal Government in their affairs a way of so doing without losing many of the benefits they now have.

And, I think it follows logically that we should do everything possible to strengthen the farm cooperatives we already have, and ease the way for new ones to be formed. One of the best ways is to assure low-cost financing.

Mr. W. B. Robins, president of the Utah Council of Farmers Co-ops, says frankly:

I believe without question that Utah farmers will be in the toughest spot in history unless we find ways to strengthen the genuine cooperatives now operating in the State, including UCA and its member cooperatives. And we must organize new ones. I believe if we do this, primarily through making available low cost, sound loans, that we can move a long way toward keeping Utah farmers on the land.

This same situation prevails, I am confident, in many other sections of the country.

Mr. President, I send to the desk a bill to amend the Consolidated Farmers Home Administration Act of 1961 to authorize loans to certain cooperatives serving farmers and rural residents, and for other purposes, and ask that it be appropriately referred.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 1971) to amend the Consolidated Farmers Home Administration Act of 1961 to authorize loans to certain cooperatives serving farmers and rural residents, and for other purposes, introduced by Mr. Moss, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

DISPOSITION OF FUNDS APPROPRIATED IN FAVOR OF THE EMIGRANT NEW YORK INDIANS

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I am today introducing legislation to provide for the disposition of funds appropriated by Congress to pay a judgment in favor of

the Emigrant New York Indians in Indian Claims Commission docket No. 75, and for other purposes.

On October 14, 1966, the U.S. Court of Claims upheld the award by the Indian Claims Commission of \$1,313,473 to the Emigrant New York Indians in compensation for Wisconsin lands of which they were unjustly deprived in 1832. The Indians in question are members of various New York Iroquois tribes which in 1822, with the full encouragement, assistance, and approval of the U.S. Government, concluded a treaty with the Menominee Tribe of Wisconsin for one-half interest in approximately 4 million acres of land in the vicinity of Green Bay. The New York Indians subsequently sold their eastern holdings and settled on their new Wisconsin lands.

In 1831 and 1832 the Menominee Tribe ceded to the United States a large portion of their lands, including the 4 million acres sold to the Emigrant New York Indians. The latter were not a party to this treaty and protested strongly. Under threats that they would be deprived of all their lands, they were forced to accept a reserve of 569,120 acres for their exclusive use. The \$1,313,473 final judgment awarded the Emigrant New York Indians represents the value of their one-half interest in the 4 million acres less certain offsets, including the value of the lands received in exchange. The Emigrant New York Indians today include the Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin, members of the Stockbridge-Munsee Indian Community of Wisconsin, and Brotherton Indians of Wisconsin of at least one-fourth degree Emigrant New York Indian blood.

The funds for this judgment have already been approved by title XIII of Public Law 90-21, the Second Supplemental Appropriation Act for 1967. My bill simply provides, according to standard and equitable practice, for the disposition of these funds to the Emigrant Indian tribes. It is thus only a routine measure, the necessary final step toward righting an old injustice. I urge the bill's immediate adoption.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 1972) to provide for the disposition of funds appropriated to pay a judgment in favor of the Emigrant New York Indians in Indian Claims Commission docket No. 75, and for other purposes, introduced by Mr. NELSON, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

NOTICE OF HEARINGS ON BILL TO CREATE A NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, I wish to announce that the Subcommittee on Government Research of the Senate Committee on Government Operations will hold hearings tomorrow, Tuesday, June 20, 1967, at 8 a.m. in room 1318 of the New Senate Office Building in the further consideration of the bill to create a National Social Science Foundation.

NOTICE OF HEARINGS ON FEDERAL JURY SELECTION BILLS—S. 383, S. 384, S. 385, S. 386, S. 387, S. 989, AND S. 1319

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator TYDINGS, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, who is ill today, I wish to announce a second set of hearings for the consideration of S. 383, S. 384, S. 385, S. 386, S. 387, S. 989, and S. 1319. These bills would provide improved judicial machinery for the selection of Federal juries.

The hearings will be held at 9:30 a.m., on Wednesday, June 28, 1967, in the District of Columbia Committee hearing room, room 6226, New Senate Office Building.

Any person who wishes to testify or submit a statement for inclusion in the record should communicate as soon as possible with the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, room 6306, New Senate Office Building.

NOTICE OF HEARING ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER—S. 915

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, as chairman of the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, I wish to announce a hearing for the consideration of S. 915. This bill would provide for the establishment of a Federal Judicial Center.

The hearing will be held at 10:30 a.m., on June 22, 1967, in the District of Columbia Committee hearing room, room 6226, New Senate Office Building.

Any person who wishes to testify or submit a statement for inclusion in the record should communicate as soon as possible with the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, room 6306, New Senate Office Building.

NOTICE OF RESCHEDULING OF HEARING ON THE REVOLVING CREDIT ASPECTS OF S. 5, THE TRUTH-IN-LENDING BILL

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I should like to announce that the Committee on Banking and Currency has rescheduled its hearing on the revolving credit aspects of the truth-in-lending bill, S.5.

The hearing, which was originally scheduled for 3 p.m. on Tuesday, June 20, has now been rescheduled for Friday, June 23, 1967, at 10 a.m.

NOTICE OF CANCELLATION OF HEARINGS ON S. 1299, MARGIN REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I should like to announce that the Committee on Banking and Currency has canceled the hearing to be held on Thursday, July 13, on the bill S. 1299, to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to permit regulation of the amount of credit that may be extended and maintained with respect to securities that are not registered on a national securities exchange.